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RANDOM DRUG TESTING FOR
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES:
HAS THE SUPREME COURT OPENED PANDORA'S BOX
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS?
Ralph D. Mawdsley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistics suggest high rates of drug use among junior high
and public high school students. 1 Even more alarming figures
from the Department of Health and Human Services reveal
that one-third of all students have used illegal drugs before
completing the eighth grade and more than half before
completing high school. 2 Apart from illicit drugs, 50.5% of
youth reported having tried alcohol (more than a few sips) by
the eighth grade, and 23.4% said they had already been drunk
at least once. 3 Moreover, students who smoked cigarettes were
more likely to use illicit drugs. 4 With the number of teens
expected to increase from 23.6 million in 2000 to 25 million in
2010, 5 the number of students participating in drug use can be
expected to increase even if the percentage of use does not.

* Ralph D. Mawdsley is a Professor of Educational Administration at Cleveland
State University in Cleveland, Ohio. He received his J.D. from the University of
Illinois and his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses
in school law, special education law, and sports law. He has published more than 250
articles and books on numerous legal issues in the field of education.
1. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1280 (lOth Cir. 2001) (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) (18.4% of twelve to seventecn-year-olds have used marijuana or hashish in
their lifetimes; 10.9% of twelve to seventcen-year-olds currently use illegal drugs; and
over half of marijuana first-time users and cocaine first-time users are between the
ages of twelve and seventeen).
2. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 U.S. 2559, 2570 (2002).
3. See Ofi of Nat!. Drug Policy, Juveniles and Drugs <http://www .whitehouse
drugpolicy.gov/drugfact/juveniles/index/html> (last updated Dec. 19, 2002).
4. ld.
5. Commn. on Substance Abuse Among America's Adolescents, Substance Abuse
and the American Adolescent (Aug. 1997).
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Beyond the general statistics of drugs among school-age
young people is the perception of drugs on school campuses.
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
(CASA) reported in its 1997 survey that 76% of high school
students and 46% of middle school students said that drugs
were kept, used, or sold on school grounds. 6 The CASA survey
revealed a dramatic difference between the perceptions of
students and teachers. 7 While 18% of middle school and 41% of
high school students reported seeing drugs sold at school, only
8% of middle school teachers, 12% of high school teachers, and
14% of principals saw drug sales. 8 The challenge for school
officials is how to address a problem that national statistics
indicate is widespread among junior and senior high school
students but which may not be apparent to school officials.
One way to address drug use in schools is drug testing of
students. The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Earls
(Earls), 9 opened the door to allow public schools to engage in
suspicionless random drug testing of students participating in
extracurricular activities. Whether drug testing will be a
panacea or a Pandora's Box for public schools is not clear. Any
school expecting that the use of random drug testing will deter
or excise student drug use needs to consider a number of legal
issues. The purposes of this article are to review the various
drug testing approaches that school districts have taken to
address drug use, examine the legal challenges that have
resulted, and consider legal issues related to the design and
implementation of a drug testing policy.

II.

SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING

Assuming that states do not mandate or prohibit random
drug testing, the decision to randomly drug test is one that will
be left to individual school districts. However, such a decision
requires consideration of a minefield of legal problems.
Suspicionless drug testing can involve testing all or a
random sample of students. In Vernonia School District v.
6. Natl. Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse, 1997 Back to School Survey
<http://www .casacolumbia.org/newsletter 145 7 /newslettershow .htm ?docid=5 793> (Sept.
8, 1997).
7. ld.
8. Id.
9. 122 S. Ct. 2559.
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Acton (Vernonia), 10 the Supreme Court addressed a school
district policy that included both kinds of testing for students
participating in interscholastic sports. All students were tested
at the beginning of their sport's season, and thereafter, ten
percent of the students were selected randomly to be tested
each week of the season.l 1
It is debatable whether the purpose of the district's policy in
Vernonia of deglamorizing drug use 12 was consistent with the
policy's implementation. Despite widespread evidence of drug
abuse throughout the student body, 13 the district's policy was
directed narrowly at only athletes "where the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug user and those with whom he is
playing his sport is particularly high." 14 The list of drugs for
which student athletes were tested (amphetamines, marijuana,
and cocaine), 15 while harmful to athletes, did not include
anabolic steroids, which pose a higher risk of harm to athletes
than the drugs included in the test. 16 While questionable, the
omission of anabolic steroids from a drug test of athletes might
still be reasonable if the purpose of the drug testing was to
prevent drug use among the student body in general. Its
absence in the Vernonia School District's drug testing policy
suggests that athletics was only a convenient vehicle to
attempt to address a broader school-wide problem.
Arguably, the Vernonia School District's decision to
randomly test athletes because they were "the leaders of the
drug culture" 17 was more strategically formulated than policydriven. Given an earlier Supreme Court decision, New Jersey
v. T.L.O. (T.L.0.), 18 that required individualized reasonable
suspicion for searches of students, selection of a group limited

10. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
11. Id. at 650.
12. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)
(students "glamorizing drug and alcohol use" was perceived as the cause of student
rebellion and led to the district's drug testing policy).
13. See id. at 1367 ("the glamorization and use of drugs and alcohol became more
blatant" and resulted in increasing frequency of classroom discipline problems).
14. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
15. Id.
16. See William N. Taylor, Anabolic Steroids and the Athlete (McFarland & Co.,
Inc. 1982) (greatest danger of anabolic steroids is to the liver with other side-effects
including possible heart attacks, sexual changes, and mental disturbance).
17. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
18. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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to those participating in extracurricular sporting events
presented a new, and more defensible 19 fact situation for
suspicionless drug testing than was addressed in T.L.O. Had
the School District in Vernonia chosen to require suspicionless
drug testing for all students, the district would have placed
itself in the untenable position of having to persuade the Court
that a suspicionless exception to T.L.O.'s individualized
reasonable suspicion was needed for all students. 20
Despite permitting suspicionless drug testing for athletes,
Vernonia left an unclear message concerning random drug
testing, in general. How much evidence of drug use must a
school have before it can use suspicionless random drug
testing? And, can a school's desire to deter drug use be a
sufficient basis to justify suspicionless testing?
The recent Supreme Court decision in Earls v. Board of
Education (Earls) 21 addressed these questions for school
districts.
Following Vernonia, some school districts had
extended random testing to a variety of other student settings,
including non-athletic extracurricular activities, 22 students
fighting, 23 students driving a car to school, and to include other
substances, particularly alcohol and nicotine. 24
19. See Bush v. Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562 (D. Minn. 1990) (example of
judicial support for discipline of athletes because athletics represents a privilege, not a
right; mere presence of athlete at an off-campus function where alcohol was served
could result in revocation of letter and suspension from competitions).
20. That the T.L.O. majority required a reasonableness standard for student
searches is highlighted by the dissenting opinion that views this standard as an
unauthorized departure from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341~43, 357~58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2559.
22. See Gardner v. Tulsa lndep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(drug testing policy for all extracurricular activities that included 80% of students
struck down because no evidence of drug-related referrals, increased use of drugs on
campus, or rising tide of student drug use); but see Linke v. N. W. Sch. Corp., 763
N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002) (extracurricular drug testing for students driving to school, and
students participating in athletics, academic teams, student government, musical
performances, drama, FFA, National Honor Society, and SADD upheld where survey of
drug use in grades seven through twelve was higher than average; nine middle/high
school suspensions and expulsions for drug use had occurred in the first year of the
policy, and three high school students had died of drug abuse in the ten years prior to
the policy).
23. See Willis 11. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998)
(court struck down policy requiring drug test for all student suspended for three or
more days for fighting).
24. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000)
(court upheld policy for random suspicionless drug testing but invalidated policy as to
testing for nicotine); Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp. v. .loy, 768 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. App.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Earls, three
federal circuits had rendered decisions involving suspicionless
random drug testing of all extracurricular activities. 25 In two
post- Vernonia decisions, 26 Todd v. Rush County Schools
(Todd) 27 and Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation
(Joy), 28
the
Seventh
Circuit
upheld
extracurricular
suspicionless drug testing policies. However, in Joy the court
had second thoughts about its earlier decision in Todd because
Todd had not utilized the three-part methodology of Vernonia
that considered the nature of the students' privacy interest, the
character of the intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of
the governmental concern at issue. 29 Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit felt compelled to follow the precedent of its earlier
decision. 30 The Eighth Circuit also upheld random testing in
Miller v. Wilkes (Miller), 31 but its decision was later vacated for
mootness. 32 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in
Earls v. Board of Education, 33 declared random testing
unconstitutional.

2002) (policy was challenged under state constitution and state appeals court upheld
testing policy as to drugs and alcohol, but not as to tobacco).
25. See Gardner, 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (federal district court ruled unconstitutional
a random suspicionless drug testing policy of all students participating in
extracurricular activities because there was no evidence of a major or widespread drug
problem among students in general); Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (pre-Vernonia
decision wherein the Fifth Circuit upheld, without opinion, a district court decision
holding unconstitutional suspicionless drug testing of students wishing to participate
in extracurricular activities).
26. The Seventh Circuit upheld random urinalysis testing of athletes in
interscholastic sports in a pre· Vernonia decision. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). The facts in Schaill mirror those later litigated in
Vernonia. A high percentage of high school students were using drugs, athletes had
diminished privacy, the school district had a legitimate interest in finding unlawful
conduct, and the procedures established by the district minimized intrusion into the
students' privacy.
27. 133 F. 3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
28. 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
29. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55, 658, 660.
30. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1066 ("the judges of this panel believe that students involved
in extracurricular activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing
as a condition of participation in the activity. Nevertheless, we are bound by this
court's recent precedent in Todd.").
31. 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).
32. To vacate means "to nullify or cancel." Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (Bryan A.
Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999).
33. 242 F. 3d 1264, rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2559.
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Although the Supreme Court frequently grants certiorari to
resolve disputes among circuits, it would be a strain to suggest
that this was the reason for the Court's decision in Earls. The
Seventh Circuit's limited support for drug testing and the
Eighth Circuit's vacated judgment standing in stark contrast to
the Tenth Circuit's strident opposition to drug testing'14 hardly
represents clearly divided circuits. Arguably, the Supreme
Court's decision in Earls has much more to do with the Court's
support for the authority of states and their local school boards
to determine educational policy for public schools than with
resolving differences among federal circuits.

A. Earls: Tenth Circuit Decision
In Earls, the Tenth Circuit struck down a school district
policy that was framed to allow performing random drug
testing of students in all extracurricular activities35 but was
actually limited in application only to those involving some
aspect of competition and sanctioned by the Oklahoma
Secondary Schools Activity Association. 36
At the federal
district court level, the court did not find evidence of "a drug
problem of epidemic proportions, or a student body in a state of
rebellion" (as in Vernonia), 37 but it did find "legitimate cause
for concern," which, when combined with judicial notice of "the
prevalence of illegal drugs in our society, including our schools"
and the attendant "discipline problems, inattentiveness, and an
atmosphere of disruption in the classroom," created a "special
need" justifying random drug testing. 38 The Tenth Circuit,
34. The strident nature of the Tenth Circuit's decision is best reflected in that
court's dissenting opinion that presaged the Supreme Court's opinion. The dissenting
judge would have justified the random drug testing policy because when young people
are more susceptible to peer pressure to use drugs, probable cause is not required in
school settings under T.L.O., drug use by some students in a public school closed
environment interferes with the rights of other students, and the Supreme Court in
Vernonia vested in public schools the responsibility to protect the children entrusted to
them. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1279-80 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1275 (the substances tested for were amphetamines, marijuana,
cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines).
36. Id. Although the district's policy was not limited to competitive
extracurricular activities, the district applied the policy only to such activities. One of
the plaintiffs in the case was a member of the show choir, the marching band, and the
academic team, and the other plaintiff desired to participate on the academic team. I d.
at 1268.
:37. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
38. ld. at 1287-88.
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however, rejected the district court's finding of special need,
and instead found that although some evidence of drug use
existed in Tecumseh public schools, "use among students
subject to the testing Policy was negligible." 39
In balancing the school district's interest in deterring drug
use with the students' expectation of privacy, the court opined
that the voluntary nature of extracurricular participation did
not translate into diminished expectation of privacy where
"participation in extracurricular activities . . . has become an
integral part of the educational experience for most students." 40
However, extracurricular participants did have "a somewhat
lesser privacy expectation than other students" because they
"agree to follow the directives and adhere to the rules set out
by the coach or other director of the activity." 41 With regard to
the health and safety issue that played a prominent part in
Vernonia, the court found the district's argument inapposite for
three reasons. First, only some of the extracurricular activities
involved a safety issue comparable to athletics. 42 Second, some
students who were involved in activities that did represent a
safety risk, "such as working with shop equipment or
laboratories," were not tested at all. 43 As the court observed, if
the school district is concerned about safety, "it too often simply
tests the wrong students." 44 Third, the court disagreed with
the district's argument that students in extracurricular
activities were supervised less than students in the classroom
because "there is an imperfect match between the need to test
and the group tested." 45 On a regular basis, students not
involved in extracurricular activities had less supervision "in
the hallways between classes, at lunch, [and] immediately
before and after school while they are entering and leaving
school premises," but they were not randomly tested. 46
39. Id. at 1275 (much of the evidence was hearsay and anecdotal, but of 484
students tested under the policy for the school years, 1989-90 and 1999-2000, there
were only 4 positive tests recorded); see id. at 1273-75 for a recounting of the evidence.
40. Id. at 1276.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1277 ("It is difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or
the academic team, of even the FHA are in physical danger if they compete in activities
while using drugs, any more than any student is at risk simply from using the drugs.").
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit majority, in applying the Supreme
Court's balancing test in Vernonia, held that the school's
interest in safety was outweighed by the students' privacy
interest because there was no evidence of drug abuse among
the group to be tested and the majority "[saw] little efficacy in a
drug policy which tests students among whom there is no
measurable drug problem." 47 The dissenting justice in Earls
vigorously disagreed with the majority's application of the
Vernonia balancing test, arguing that, since students have
diminished privacy expectations and have experienced only
minimal intrusion on their privacy in providing a urine sample,
the school's interest can be outweighed only if it is "truly
insignificant," which was "clearly not the case." 48 Nonetheless,
the majority cast a sop to public school districts by noting that
they do not need to "wait until [they] can identify a drug abuse
problem of epidemic proportions before [they] may drug test
groups of [their] students." 49 However, the majority disavowed
"any bright line mark concerning the magnitude at which a
drug problem becomes severe enough to warrant a
suspicionless drug testing policy," 50 thus leaving public schools
with little practical guidance.

B. Earls: Supreme Court Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit. Writing for the majority, 51 Justice Thomas concluded
that the school's drug testing policy was "a reasonably effective
means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns
in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use." 52

1. Majority Opinion
The majority relied heavily on the Court's decision in
Vernonia, and rejected plaintiffs' claim that "drug testing must
/d.
Id. at 1283.
/d.
ld.
51. Tn addition to Justice Thomas who wrote the majority opinion, the other
members of the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Breyer. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented in
an opinion joined by Justice Souter. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in
which ,Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined.
52. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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be based at least on some level of individualized suspicion." 53
The Court's threefold analysis considered the students'
expectation of privacy, the "character of the intrusion" on
student privacy, and "the nature and immediacy of the
government's concerns." 54
First, with respect to the students' expectation of privacy,
the Court found a diminished expectation of privacy for
students in question, because, like the athletes in Vernonia,
students in all extracurricular activities "voluntarily subject
themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy ." 55
Although some of the clubs and activities involved "off-campus
travel and communal undress," similar to Vernonia, the Court
found more dispositive the presence of "rules and requirements
for participating students that do not apply to the student body
as a whole." 56
Second, considering the character of intrusion on student
privacy, the majority found the district's intrusion to be
minimal in this case. The majority relied on several factors to
support this finding. First, the method of collection was
virtually identical to Vernonia with the added privacy element
that male students could produce their samples behind a closed
stall. 57 Second, drug test results were kept in confidential files
separate from a student's other educational records and were
available only to school personnel on a "need-to-know" basis.
Evidence that a choir teacher had looked at a student's
medication list was not considered intrusive because the
teacher would have had access to this kind of information prior
to the drug testing policy, and, in any case, the teacher needed
to know this information with regard to choir performances offcampus. 58
Third, test results were not released to law
enforcement authority and negative test results did not lead to
school discipline or academic consequences. Finally, even the
limitation on a student's "privilege of participating in
extracurricular activities" was softened by a progressive
penalty system.59

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 2564.
at 2566-{)7.
at 2566.

at 2567 (after a first positive test, the student could continue participating
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Finally, the Court addressed the nature and immediacy of
the government's concerns and found that it was based on the
importance "in preventing drug abuse by schoolchildren ... [as
reflected by a] drug abuse problem among our Nation's youth
[that] has hardly abated since Vernonia was decided in 1995."60
A "particularized or pervasive drug problem" is not necessary
to justify a suspicionless drug testing policy. 61 Because of "the
nationwide epidemic of drug use," the Court considered that it
made little sense "to require a school district to wait for a
substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it
was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to
deter drug use."62
The Court rejected plaintiffs' claim that reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing should be required for drug testing,
finding a number of problems that might be associated with
such a standard. Not only would such a standard "place an
additional burden on public school teachers," but it "might
unfairly target members of unpopular groups." 63 In addition,
individualized suspicion could lead to the fear of lawsuits that
"may chill enforcement of the program."64
The Court instead stated that drug testing of students
under the Fourth Amendment need only be reasonable and
"does not require employing the least intrusive means." 65
Vernonia did not require that schools test the group of students
most likely to use drugs, but instead evaluated drug testing "in
the context of public school's custodial responsibilities." 66

if, within five days of meeting with parents, the student shows proof of receiving drug
counseling and submits to a drug test within two weeks. After a second test, a student
is suspended from participation for fourteen days and can return to participation after
completing 4 hours of substance abuse counseling. Only after the third offense will a
student be suspended from participation for the balance of the school year or eighty.
eight days, whichever is longer).
60. Id.
61. ld. at 2568 (citing Natl. Treasury Employees v. Von Raub, 489 U.S. 656 (1989),
in which the Court upheld drug testing for customs employees because government had
a legitimate interest in testing employees in safety sensitive positions, namely those
persons checking for drug trafficking).
62. Id. at 2568.
63. ld. at 2568-69.
64. ld. at 2569.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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2. Breyer Concurring
As the fifth vote for the majority, Justice Breyer's opinion
does nothing to qualifY the constitutional position of the
majority. Although he noted that there is no way of knowing
whether the school district's drug testing program will work, he
declared unequivocally that "the Constitution does not prohibit
the effort." 67 He underscored the reasoning of Justice Thomas
by observing that the drug problem in schools is serious,
emphasizing that supply side interdiction of drugs has not
reduced teenage drug use. Accordingly, he emphasized that
schools must find new and effective ways to fulfill their in loco
parentis responsibilities, and the random drug testing policy in
dispute provides students a non-threatening reason to decline
drug-use invitations, namely, in order to participate in
extracurricular activities. 68
For Justice Breyer, the counterargument to alleged
intrusion into student privacy is the democratic process that
the school board engaged in that was designed to give the
entire community the opportunity to develop the drug policy.
The policy, as formulated, preserved the status of a
"conscientious objector" for the student who does not want to
participate in drug testing. While the student exercising this
status pays a price in nonparticipation, that price is "less
severe than [would be] expulsion from the school." 69

3. Dissenting Opinions
In her two-line dissent, Justice O'Connor dissented for the
same reason that she did in Vernonia, namely that that case
had been wrongly decided. 70 And, even if Vernonia had been
decided correctly, stated O'Connor, Earls did not meet the
balancing test in that case.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg provided the
rationale for the four dissenters. She concurred in Vernonia,
but with the caveat that "I comprehend the Court's opinion as

67. ld. at 2571.
68. !d. at 2570.
69. ld. at 2571.
70. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (O'Connor's argument
is that, like Vernonia, suspicionless searches for students do not fit within "allowed
exceptions ... where it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be
ineffectual.").
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reserving the question whether the District, on no more than
the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in
team sports, but on all students required to attend school." 71 In
her dissent in Earls, Justice Ginsburg opines that the Court
has stepped over the limit.
Essentially, Justice Ginsburg's position is that Vernonia
established
a
reasonableness
test
m
determining
appropriateness of intrusion into student privacy and the
argument on behalf of the school district in Earls does not rise
to that level. Students' presence in public schools and their
voluntary participation in extracurricular activities are "factors
relevant to reasonableness, but they do not on their own justifY
intrusive, suspicionless searches." 72
Justice Ginsburg found the school district's policy provided
no effort to tailor the testing to the population affected by the
drug use, as had been the case in Vernonia where "sports team
members faced special health risks and they 'were the leaders
in the drug culture."' 73 School district efforts to suggest safety
problems with marching band members carrying heavy
instruments, Future Farmers of America wrestling animals,
and Future Homemakers of America working with sharp
cutlery were met with Justice Ginsburg's whimsical references
to "out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding
tubas." 74
At the heart of the dissent was a concern that
extracurricular activities, although voluntary, are "a key
component of school life, essential in reality for students
applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational
experience." 75 However, the result of the Earls drug testing
policy would be that, "[e]ven if students might be deterred from
drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it
is at least as likely that other students might forego their
extracurricular involvement in order to avoid detection of their
drug use." 76 Thus, pressed to its logical conclusion, the policy,
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2573-74.
ld. at 2577 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649).
Id. at 2576.
ld. at 2573.
Id. at 2577.
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according to the dissent, not only intrudes unreasonably upon
student privacy, but also fails to deter drug use. 77

4. Analysis and Implications
The Supreme Court in Earls, as it had done in its earlier
decision in the session in Owasso Independent School District
v. Falvo (Falvo), 78 stopped short of making educational policy.
Just as the Court in Falvo did not rule that school districts
should adopt peer-grading as a pedagogical strategy to enhance
student learning, 79 so also the Court in Earls did not decide
that schools should adopt random drug testing to deter or
extirpate student drug use. In both cases, the Court simply
removed potential federal statutory (Falvo - FERPA) 80 and
constitutional (Earls - Fourth Amendment) barriers to the
creation of educational policy by school boards.
Earls opens the door for more school districts to impose
random drug testing on students participating in
extracurricular activities. The case extended the class of
students who can be randomly tested for drugs. In Earls, the
Court upheld random drug testing for those students in
extracurricular activities that are part of a state's
interscholastic competition.
Thus, drug testing in Earls
includes not only the athletes who were approved for testing in
Vernonia, but also the Future Farmers of America (FFA) and
Future Homemakers of America (FHA), and, in addition, the
show choir, the marching band, and the academic team in
which the plaintiffs in Earls were interested. 81
In the aftermath of Earls, what other refinements in the
application of random drug testing could be made? Earls does
not distinguish between curriculum and non-curriculum

77. ld.
78. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo 122 S. Ct. 934 (2002) (in Falvo, a
unanimous Court held that peer-grading did not constitute a violation of FERPA).
79. ld. at 939 ("Correcting a classmate's work can be as much a part of the
assignment as taking the test itself. It is a way to teach material again in a new
context, and it helps show students how to assist and respect fellow pupils. By
explaining the answers to the class as the students correct the papers, the teacher not
only reinforces the lesson but also discovers whether the students have understood the
material and are ready to move on.").
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (FERPA provides students protection from
authorized disclosure of personally identifiable information and provides parents
access to a child's education records).
81. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268.
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related groups of students, but presumably, this distinction, so
vital in determining applicability of the Equal Access Act
(EAA), 82 could also apply to drug testing. Could a school
district decide to limit random drug testing only to noncurriculum-related groups? For example, could students who
want to participate in a Bible club be required to submit to a
drug test? Earls addresses only the issue of whether nonathletic, extracurricular groups can be drug tested, not which
groups can be tested thus leaving open the question of how
schools might choose to define such groups.
Presumably, in addition to curriculum-relatedness, other
categories for random testing might include students who drive
to school or students belonging to groups that have off-campus
components. Earls appears to give schools freedom in defining
the student groups to be tested as long as those groups are
voluntary and governed by rules not applicable to the student
body at large. Additionally, these groups would have to be
chosen by criteria that are neutral, generally applicable, and
not based on the expressive content of the student group. 83
These criteria, in part, reflect Justice Thomas' concern about
not "target[ing] members of unpopular groups." 84
The requirement that a school district demonstrate a
special need to support its drug testing policy, as had been
done in Vernonia, seems to have dissipated in Earls. Evidence
in Vernonia based on student drug use surveys 85 and
disciplinary referrals reaching "epidemic proportions" 86
indicated not only a drug culture, but also that the athletes, the
82. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000) (EAA prohibits public schools from preventing
student-initiated meetings in limited open forums "on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech" where any noncurriculumrelated student clubs are permitted to meet during noninstructional time).
83. Preventing public schools from singling out particular viewpoints for different
treatment has a recent history in the Supreme Court beginning with Lamb's Chapel u.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), through Good News Club u.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). In a series of cases bordered by these two, the
Court held that, under free speech, schools cannot treat groups differently based on the
content of their message. In essence, the notion that categories must be neutral and
generally applicable would apply to any objection based on discriminatory treatment.
84. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567.
85. The use of surveys has met with differing results. See e.g. Tannahill u.
Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (a survey of
students revealed that student drug use of drugs in the school was lower than
stateside); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272-74 (perceptions of faculty were not considered
persuasive).
86. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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groups eventually tested, were the leaders of that culture. In
Earls this level of evidence was reduced to teacher testimony
that "they had seen students who appeared to be under the
influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking
openly of using drugs." 87 Although the Court stated that this
was "sufficient evidence to shore up the need for [the district's]
drug testing program," 88 the Court's refusal "to fashion ... a
constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a drug
problem" 89 suggests that the meaning of special needs was not
the same in Earls as it had been in Vernonia. What is not clear
is whether the new test in Earls provides a lower floor or
simply eliminates the floor altogether.
Arguably, Earls creates a new lower floor of evidence
necessary to justify drug testing based solely on anecdotal
evidence and teacher observations. However, it is equally
arguable that the Court's reasoning suggests that no evidence
is required at all. On one hand the Court defines its test as not
requiring "a particularized or pervasive drug problem" before
allowing suspicionless drug testing, 90 but on the other hand the
court finds support for drug testing in National Treasury
Employees v. Van Raub (Van Raub). 91 In Van Raub, the Court
upheld random drug testing for customs inspectors, not
because there was particularized or pervasive evidence of drug
use, but because custom inspectors, as those persons charged
with preventing the flow of drugs into the country, can
reasonably constitute a safety sensitive group that can be
required to submit to suspicionless drug tests. 92
More
importantly, the Court in Earls cites Van Raub for the
principle that drug testing can be done "on a purely preventive
basis." 93 Thus, it is unclear whether the Court's standard for
87. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567.
88. ld. at 2568.
89. ld.
90. !d.
91. 489 u.s. 656.
92. /d. at 67 4. ("[T]he almost unique mission of the [Treasury] Service gives the
Government a compelling interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do
not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against
which the Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and
national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions
that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the
Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be
deemed unreasonable.").
93. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568.
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use of a random drug test lowers the floor whereby schools
must provide some evidence of student drug use (less than
particularized and pervasive) or eliminates the floor altogether
since the basis for testing can be purely preventive.
Another question that Earls leaves unanswered is whether
random drug testing could be extended to all students enrolled
in a public school. In an earlier post- Vernonia but pre-Earls
decision, Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District, 94 a
federal district court struck down both a mandatory and
random drug test policy for all students in grades six through
twelve. The district court reasoned that "students subject to
drug testing in the Lockney School District comprise a much
broader segment of the student population than the group of
student athletes in Vernonia. Their expectations of privacy are
higher." 95 If the Supreme Court were to decide a Tannahill set
of facts now, it is likely that it would come to the same
conclusion but for a different reason.
The Court would
probably defer to its earlier decision in T.L.0., 96 where it
upheld an individualized reasonable suspicion standard for
conducting student searches.
Beyond the question of the appropriate standard for
determining when drug testing is justified lies the
consideration of how the results of drug testing should be used.
Justice Thomas thought significant a part of the Earls policy
that limited the results of testing to participation in
extracurricular activities.
Students in extracurricular
activities who tested positive for drugs were not removed from
school or reported to law enforcement authorities. Does Earls
stand for the principle that the results of a suspicionless search
cannot be used to remove students from academic classes or be
reported to law enforcement? If so, does Earls apply only to
drug testing or does it also include other forms of suspicionless
searches, particularly metal detectors and canine sniffs?
Even though evidence obtained in searches stemming from
the use of metal detectors and sniffing dogs frequently leads to
school discipline and law enforcement reporting, 97 there is no
94. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919
95. /d. at 929.
96. 469 U.S. 325.
97. See Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (upheld expulsion of student that resulted from search of student's truck
following alert from dog); Cmmw. v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998) (motion to suppress
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reason to expect that Earls would be applied broadly to all
suspicionless searches. While drug testing produces evidence
of wrongdoing itself, a positive response to a metal detector or a
sniffing dog forms the basis for a search based on
individualized reasonable suspicion. It is this intervening
individualized reasonable suspicion that differentiates the
suspicionless use of metal detectors and sniffing dogs from
suspicionless drug testing.
A more senous effect of Earls is the use of state
constitutions to challenge drug testing. Although Earls found
random drug testing constitutional under the United States
Constitution, there is no assurance that states will find the
practice valid under their own constitutions. 98 Since the effect
of the Earls decision is permissive only in terms of determining
whether schools can use drug testing, states would still be free
to interpret the practice in light of their own constitutions, in
much the same manner that cases can be addressed under the
Establishment Clause. 99 The fact that some state courts have
already found random drug testing to be a violation of their
state constitutions probably suggests that this will be a
litigation wave of the future. 100 Thus, after Earls, school
denied for marijuana discovered in student's locker as result of reasonable suspicion
search following an alert by a dog); People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. 1996)
(motion to suppress denied for guns found on two students following alert by metal
detector).
98. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (court upheld testing policy as to
drugs and alcohol, but struck down testing for nicotine under the state's constitution
protecting liberty interests); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 40 P.3d 1198 (Wash. App.
2002) (drug testing policy for athletes violated Fourth Amendment and state
constitution where there was no state compelling interest); Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d
919 (random drug testing policy for students in interscholastic athletics violated state
constitution where no evidence of student drug use and injury to athletes); Theodore v.
Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. 2000) (random drug testing of students
involved in extracurricular activities and driving to school invalidated under federal
constitution); Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (random drug
testing policy for extracurricular activities unconstitutional under federal constitution
as applied to marching band).
99. See Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (Court
upheld, against Establishment Clause challenge, state provision of assistance to blind
student in a religious college). On remand, the state supreme court invalidated the
assistance under the state constitution. Witters v. Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989).
100. In cases where the constitutionality of random drug testing has been
addressed only under the federal constitution, litigants may well revisit the issue
under state constitutions. See Theodore, 761 A.2d 652 (random drug testing of students
involved in extracurricular activities and driving to school invalidated under federal
constitution); Trinidad, 963 P.2d 1095 (random drug testing policy for extracurricular
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districts spared the time and expense of defending their
random drug testing policies under the federal constitution
may find that they have to make the same investment under
their state's constitution.
Two practical implementation questions left after Earls
concern the relationship between school's authority to test
versus parental control over their children and the cost of
testing. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer references
the in loco parentis doctrine as providing diminished privacy
rights to students and authorizing school officials to protect
students. He concludes that, if public school officials do not
carry out their responsibilities appropriately, "parents [may]
send their children to private and parochial school [sic] instead
-with the help from the State." 101
The assumption that parents will remove their children if
schools do not test for drugs overlooks the argument that
parents may choose to remove their children because the public
school is randomly testing. In loco parentis can be a convenient
legal fiction for public schools, 102 but school officials may find
that they have exceeded the limits of that fiction by
implementing a policy that some parents neither favor nor
would authorize for application to their children. Justice
Breyer's comments about the importance of a democratic
process involving parents in designing a drug testing policy to
the contrary, parents, as was evident in both Vernonia and
Earls, are not likely to acquiesce in a policy that is
fundamentally opposed to their views of child rearing or their
views on drug use. As a result, as Justice Breyer pointedly
notes, the possibility of voucher money from states may
facilitate and accelerate the departure of students from public

activities unconstitutional under federal constitution as applied to marching band).
101. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2570. The reference to state help is to the Court's decision
upholding the use of vouchers in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
102. See generally Ralph Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, Ill.
B.J. (Aug. 1973) (in loco parentis qualifies as a legal fiction because, while it purports
to grant school officials the authority of parents to deal with students, the match
between the two is not perfect. For example, parents do not have the authority to
suspend or expel students that schools have, nor do schools share the immunity from
civil lawsuits that parents enjoy). That in loco pa.rentis is not sufficient to justifY public
school authority is reflected in T.L.O.: "Today's public school officials do not merely
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act
in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies." T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 336.
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schools, 103 presumably to private schools that do not test for
drugs.
The second question, cost, may create even more of a
limitation on the drug testing policies that can be realistically
implemented without harming a school's ability to effectively
operate.
With public school districts struggling to meet
operating expenses, how many could afford the cost of testing
10% of their students per week, as was the case in Vernonia?
If the average cost per test were $30, the cost of simply
administering weekly drug tests would amount to $3,000 per
week in a school of 1,000 students and approximately $108,000
per year.I 04
Of course, the school could lower the percentage or number
of students tested each week, but at some point the number
would become so low as to lose its deterrent value. In addition,
students who may not feel singled out when they are part of a
larger group selected for testing, may feel more vulnerable and
isolated when they are part of a very small number.
Consequently, school districts now permitted to randomly drug
test must decide whether they will do so at the cost of lost
dollars and the possible loss of students.
Justice Ginsburg's concern about the relationship between
the educational program of drug testing and student's resulting
decisions to not participate in extracurricular activities is one
that schools that choose to randomly test will also have to face.
Will students, even if they know that extracurricular
participation may be important to college admission, refuse to
participate if they (and, presumably, their parents) object to
random drug testing? If there can be a widespread acceptance
among students of a drug culture, as had been the case in
Vernonia, it seems just as possible that there could be a
widespread rejection of extracurricular participation if drug
testing is required.
Whether excluding or discouraging students from
participating in extracurricular activities results in harmful

103. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (Court upheld a state voucher plan that provided
low income families with tuition money to attend other public and nonpub1ic, including
religious, schools).
104. Drug testing typically costs $70,000 per year for weekly random tests of 75
students. Dana Hawkins, Trial by Vial, U.S. News & World Rep. 73 (May 31, 1999).
See also George Dohrman, War on Drugs Only a Skirmish, L.A. Times C-6 (Jan. 25 .
1996) (in part discussing the cost of drug testing).
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effects for students is a matter of dispute. Some studies have
suggested that,
among certain student populations,
participation in extracurricular activities may diminish the
drop-out rate and criminal behavior of high-risk students, 105
while other studies have found no connection. 106 Even if
students do not participate in public school activities, they may
find alternatives to make themselves attractive to colleges and
universities by participating in community service activities.
In any event, Justice Breyer's idea of a democratic process in
formulating a drug testing policy will probably go a long way in
building community support; however, schools may find that
this process will need to be ongoing to address the concerns of
evolving groups of parents.

C. Drug Testing Policies: Procedures and Rationale
Although one cannot predict how many public schools will
begin drug testing now that it is constitutionally permissible,
school boards that want to use random testing need to consider
carefully the policy they develop and follow. A drug testing
policy developed by a school district should account for ten
separate elements that have been addressed in federal and
state cases addressing random testing: (1) rationale for testing;
(2) statement of the substance(s) for which students will be
105. See Joseph Mahoney, School Extracurricular Activity Participation as a
Modemtor in the Development of Antisocial Patterns, 71 Child Dev. 502 (2002) (in a
long-term longitudinal study of 695 boys and girls interviewed from childhood through
high school and again at ages twenty to twenty-four, participation in extracurricular
activities was associated with reduced rates of early dropout and criminal arrest
among high risk boys and girls, but the decline in antisocial behavior was dependent on
whether the students' social network also participated in extracurricular activities).
However, the conclusion of the author is somewhat ambivalent: "The issue seems to be
what the adolescent is participating in and with whom. The success of extracurricular
activity participation may lie in its emphasis on structured, progressive skill
development that is inherently interesting to the participant and directly related to
conventional values." Id. at 514. For an article suggesting higher retention rates among
Hispanic students involved in extracurricular activities, see Deanna B. Davalos et al.,
The Effects of Extracurricular Activity, Ethnic Identification, and Perception of School
on Student Dropout Rates, 21 Hispanic J. of Behavioral Sci. 61 (1999).
106. Not all studies have found a positive benefit related to student participation
in extracurricular activities. See T. Andersson, Developmental Patterns and the
Dynamics of Alcohol Problems in Adolescence and Young Adulthood 377-391 (as cited
in Developmental Science and the Holistic Approach (L.R. Bergman, R.B. Cairns, L.G.
Nilsson & L. Nystedt eds., Lawrence Erlbaum 2000)); G.J. Botvin, Substance Abuse
Prevention Through Life Skills Twining 215-40 (as cited in Preventing Childhood
Disorders, Substance Abuse and Delinquency (R. D. Peters & R. J. McMahon eds., Sage
Publications 1996)).
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tested; (3) designation of school activities covered by drug
testing; (4) requirement of a consent form; (5) procedure for
determining how students are to be selected randomly; (6)
procedure to be followed in collecting the sample for the
substance(s) prohibited by the policy; (7) the tests to be used as
determined by the substances to be tested; (8) report of positive
test results to appropriate school officials; (9) defenses
available to students testing positive; and, (10) and penalties
for students testing positive.

1. Rationale for Random Testing
Even though the Supreme Court in Earls suggests that
deterrence of drug use among students is a sufficient basis for
a random drug testing policy, school boards are probably better
served to assert additional reasons in support of their drug
testing policies. Hopefully, not many schools will have to
declare, as the school did in Vernonia, that a crisis situation
exists with some or all students in extracurricular activities
involved in the drug culture. 107 Since Vernonia, courts have
struggled with the nature of a "special need" that must be
shown to justifY testing a portion of the student population. 108
This struggle has been lessened by the decision in Earls that
lowered the degree of need from what Vernonia previously held
must be demonstrated.
The kinds of statements that will probably suffice after
Earls may include assertions of student involvement with
prohibited substances based on teacher observations and
surveys 109 as well as the effect of those substances on student
107. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649 ("athletes were the leaders of the drug culture ...
[and] [d]isciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions").
108. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 661 (court found no "special need" to test only
extracurricular activity students and compared the school's approach to concern for the
health of those students as "offering a polio vaccine only to those students engaged in
extracurricular activities").
109. See e.g. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310 (pre-Vernonia random testing policy tests of
athletes indicated that 5 of 16 produced positive results of marijuana); Todd, 133 F.3d
at 985 (pre-random testing policy survey indicated that student use of alcohol and
cigarettes was higher than state average; although marijuana use was lower, school
had witness testimony that drug use was increasing); Joy, 212 F.3d at 1064 (school had
no evidence of a correlation between drug use and extracurricular activities or driving
to school). See also Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (statewide survey of sixth,
eighth, tenth and twelfth grade students in 1993, 1995, and 1997 indicated that the
school system was "much more likely" than the national average to use "gateway
drugs," defined as alcohol and tobacco, and had a "higher than average use" of "most
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performance. Such evidence may include not only statements
about the obvious risk to athletes of "impairment of judgment,
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain" 110
and the risk to those driving to school, 111 but also less obvious
statements, as in Earls, about "band members perform[ing]
routines with heavy instruments and FFA members ...
wrestl[ing] animals." 112
However, this discussion of
participation and risk level will necessarily be limited since the
risk levels in some extracurricular activities may be highly
attenuated.l 13
Generally, students in extracurricular activities have been
considered leaders with high visibility in their schools, an
argument that clearly applies to athletes with lesser
application to other student organizations, and, as the
argument goes, with that leadership comes a need for
"undermining the effects of peer pressure by providing a
legitimate reason for students to refuse to use illegal
drugs .... "114 In addition, as the Supreme Court of Indiana
reflected in upholding random drug testing in Linke, most of
the extracurricular activities have off-campus components and
school officials "need a broader range of tools to insure
compliance with its rules when activities occur off campus," 115
an argument that may be deceptively simplistic since most
academic classes may also have field trip components.U 6 In
any event, the main support for applying testing to all
extracurricular activities relies on the voluntary nature of
participation and, thus, a voluntary subjection by students to
rules and a measure of control that extends beyond that in
academic courses. 117

other types of drugs").
110. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
111. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 984.
112. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
113. As the Tenth Circuit points out in Earls, some extracurricular activities, such
as vocal choir and the academic team represent no more risk of injury than in regular
academic classes. ld.
114. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 986.
115. ld. at 984.
116. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
117. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
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2. Statement of Substances Tested
Generally, drug testing policies test for illegal drugs and
misused prescription drugs, such as "amphetamines,
barbiturates, benzodiazepines (such as Valium and Librium),
cocaine, opiates, PCP, and marijuana." 118 Included in the
testing could be the metabolites 119 of these drugs. 120 Several
school district policies have provided for the testing of tobacco
and/or alcohol as well. 121 None of the reported policies have
identified anabolic steroids even though the policy includes
athletic as well as non-athletic participants. 122
Cost is a factor in determining the substances to be tested
for, and school boards will need to consider carefully at the
outset what kind of investment they are willing to make.
Boards would be free to reduce the numbers of students if cost
becomes an issue, but they need to be aware that reducing
numbers may be viewed by parents and students as a reduction
in priority.
The two general methods of testing are the enzyme
multiplied immunoassay technique (EMIT) and Gas
Chromatography (CG-MS). EMIT is the usual test for many
drugs such as amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates and
phencyclidine (PCP). The cost for screening these drugs is $20
to $50. Testing for alcohol, nicotine (tobacco), and LSD
normally adds another $10 per substance per screening test.
Including anabolic steroids increases the cost of the test to $80
to $120 per test. 123 Using EMIT to test for these substances
increases the cost of the test package because it requires
separate analysis of individual additives in each of the

118. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267; Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 802. To this list, the
district policy in Linke, 763 N.E.2d 972, added methadone, methaqualone, and
propoxyphene.
119. Metabolites are waste products of the metabolic process that are toxic to the
body. Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary 413 (1995).
120. See Miller, 172 F.3d at 576.
121. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 942; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1054; Todd,
133 F.3d at 984 (tested for both alcohol and tobacco/nicotine); Miller, 172 F.3d at 576
(alcohol only).
122. Athletics may involve testing for performance enhancing substances that do
not apply to the general student population. See e.g. Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d
877 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (a coach was suspended for recommending to a track athlete that
he consume caffeine prior to a meet in order to increase performance).
123. Natl. Fedn. of St. High Sch. Assn., Drug Testing in School Activities
<http://www.nfhs.org/sportsmed/drug_testing4.htm> (last accessed May 16, 2002).
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particular drugs. For example, tobacco requires a separate test
for the additive nicotine.

3. Designation of Activities Covered
Although the policy in Earls addressed only competitive
extracurricular activities, 124 there is no reason to believe that
school districts could not extend testing to all extracurricular
activities. 125 The only caveat is that application of random
testing to all students will probably fail if it does not also
satisfy the individualized reasonable susp1c10n test of
Vernonia. 126 In Todd, Joy, and Linke, school districts extended
their drug testing policy to students who drove to school and
there is nothing in Earls to suggest that such an application of
a policy would be unconstitutional.
Under Earls, defining the groups to be tested does not
appear to require a direct relationship between the students
using drugs and the students selected for testing. If evidence
of drug use is required, it need only be general anecdotal
evidence of drug use within the school at large.

4. Requirement of Consent Form
In order to participate in extracurricular activities, each
student and their parents should be required to sign a consent
form. Failure to sign the form renders the student ineligible to
participate until the form is signed.
In Joy, the court
recognized the consent form as serving three purposes: (1) it
provided notice that random drug testing would occur; (2) it
authorized the school to administer random drug tests; and (3)

124. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 (the policy included such extracurricular activities
as FFA, FHA, and Porn Porn, but the school applied the policy only to state athletic
association sanctioned activities). In Linke, the district's policy included co-curricular
activities that were extensions of curricular classes and involved credits or grades.
Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975.
125. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (all extracurricular activities were
covered); Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975 (all athletics and certain specified extracurricular
and co-curricular activities were covered). In Todd, 133 F.3d at 984, besides athletics,
the school district defined certain extracurricular activities to include "Student
Council, Foreign Language Clubs, Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of
America [FFA] and the Library Club." One of the plaintiffs in Todd was prohibited
from videotaping the football game because he refused to sign the consent form. !d. at
985. In Miller, 172 F.3d at 577, the policy extended to such activities as "Radio Club,
prom committees, the quiz bowl, and school dances."
126. See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919.
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it was written indicia of the student's voluntary choice to
participate in activities covered by the drug testing policy . 127
While school policies in case law require both the student's
and parent's signatures, they do not address whether a
student's signature without a parent's is sufficient to require
that the school permit the student to participate in
extracurricular activities. Although an argument can be made
in certain contexts that a student may have rights in school
settings independent from the parent, 128 such should not be the
case where participation in school activities may subject the
student to the possibility of injury and the school to the
possibility of parental litigation for permitting the student to
participate without parental consent. 129
The absence of a consent form would normally keep
students from participating in extracurricular activities.
However, the school district policy in Linke struck an
interesting balance for students in co-curricular activities those activities outside the normal school day that were
extensions of classes for which credit or grades were earned.
Those students who chose not to participate in the testing
program were given alternative assignments for academic
credit in lieu of participating in public performances. 130
Linke reflects the delicate balance addressed by Justice
Thomas in Earls, namely that enforcement of the school
district's policy did not affect attendance at school. Assuming
Earls will be read broadly to say that evidence of suspicionless
searches cannot be used to suspend or expel from school, will
that prohibition apply to academic penalties, as those in Linke,
flowing from removal from extracurricular activities? The
uncertainty in Earls regarding the application of suspicionless
searches to non-extracurricular participation suggests that
schools may need to adjust penalties, as was done in Linke,
where both extracurricular participation and grades in courses
are connected.
127. The consent form generally refers to the school activities covered by the
testing policy as privileges, not rights. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1055.
128. See Baker u. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd without opinion,
423 U.S. 907 (1975) (parent did not have a liberty clause right to prohibit use of
corporal punishment in her son's school but her son had a liberty clause in his own
right to challenge the use of corporal punishment against him).
129. See generally Ralph Mawdslcy, Parents' Rights to Direct Their Children's
Education, 162 Ed. L. Rep. 659 (2002).
130. 763 N.E.2d at 975.
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5. Procedure for Selecting Students
An important part of the drug testing process is the
procedure by which students are selected. Unfortunately, this
procedure is not elaborated upon in most of the reported cases.
However, a few cases indicate that the procedure for randomly
selecting students is accomplished according to criteria related
to the frequency of testing 131 and the number of students to be
selected. 132 In Linke, the school district contracted with a
private testing firm that used a computer program to randomly
select individuals for testing and then provided those names to
the school principals. 133 Students were not provided advance
notice of the testing.
All suspicionless drug testing policies would have to
determine a random basis for the testing consistent with their
purpose of deterring drug use and drug-related injuries. 134
Without a system for determining randomness, schools would
run the risk that drug testing might lose its suspicionless
character and appear to be targeting specific individuals. Once
specific students are targeted for testing, school officials would
lose the basis for suspicionless testing and would have to
demonstrate a reasonable suspicion for their testing. 135

6. Collecting Samples
Collection of urine samples for testing follows specific steps
set forth in each school district's policy. Although the steps may
vary somewhat among policies, the following summary of the
three important steps of collecting samples represents a collage

131. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650 (ten percent of athletes per week during the
sport's season); Theodore, 261 A.2d at 654 (test administered monthly to five percent of
participating students).
132. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311 (athletes were assigned numbers and one
student was selected for testing); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 (students called out of
classrooms in groups of two and three).
133. 763 F.2d at 975.
134. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 985 (student survey indicated drug use had increased
prior to the implementation of a random drug testing policy and drug use had caused
death and injury to several students); Joy, 212 F.3d at 1055 (drug testing of students
driving to school relied on studies and newspaper articles on students under the
influence of alcohol involved in automobile accidents).
135. See Willis, 158 F.3d 415 (school policy requiring students suspended to not be
readmitted without a drug test failed under special needs test, the basis for random
testing, because school officials had a basis for determining reasonable suspicion when
they met with the student in a disciplinary hearing).
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of various policies. 136 First, prior to taking the sample, the
person responsible for collecting the sample 137 accompanies the
student to a stall in a restroom, flushes the toilet, and applies a
dye to the water in the toilet.l 38 This person of the same
gender as the student may provide the student an opportunity,
either prior to or just after the sample has been provided, to list
all medications taken by the student. 139 Second, the school
official waits outside the stall while the student provides the
sample and then may test the temperature of the urine. 140
Either the student, or the school official in the presence of the
student, seals the container. Both the student and official sign
a form attached to the sample to begin the chain of custody.
Third, assuming that the test is not being administered by a
representative of the testing agency, the sample is carried to an
appropriate school official responsible for transmitting it to the
testing agency. 141 This official signs the custody form and
transmits the sample to the designated testing agency where
the persons receiving the sample and performing the test sign
the form. 142
Collecting information about a student's medications raises
a privacy interest for students because this information may be

136. The most comprehensive test administration is found in Schaill, 864 F.2d at
1311.
137. This person can be a faculty member (Earls), a representative of a private
testing agency (Linke), a health paraprofessional (Penn-Harris-Madison), or a school
nurse (Theodore).
138. In Joy, the student leaves all outer garments, bags and purses outside the
collection facility. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1057. See also Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976.
139. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268; Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (in both cases
a student is given the opportunity to list medications on a form to be transmitted to the
testing agency that is placed in a sealed envelope and not viewed by school district
employees). Another option to providing the information at the time of testing is to
wait until a positive test is reported and then allow the student to submit
documentation that would justifY a positive result. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975.
140. See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1099.
141. Compare Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976 (testing agency employee takes charge of
sample and carries it to the laboratory), with Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940
(sample is temporarily stored at school until transmitted to laboratory).
142. Identification of the persons who must be called as witnesses to provide
appropriate foundation to introduce the results of drug testing into evidence at a school
board hearing depends on the qualifications of the person taking the sample and the
employment relationship between the person performing the test and the testing
facility. See Arriola v. Orleans Parish Sch. Ed., 809 So. 2d 232 (La. 2002) (testimony of
phlebotomist who took urine sample was sufficient to form basis for foundation to
introduce testing results where that person was also employed by the testing
laboratory).
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indicative of a disease or medical condition. 143 In Vernonia, the
school district's random drug testing policy was silent as to who
was to receive the medication lists. The Supreme Court
interpreted the district's policy as implying that medication
lists would be sent by sealed envelope to the testing service, 144
under the principle that "disclosure to teachers and coaches persons who personally know the student - is a greater
invasion of privacy." 145 Justice Thomas in Earls considered
this matter of privacy differently and found a choir teacher's
examination of a choir member's drug list not to be a problem
because the teacher would need to know that information when
the students are performing off-campus, and, in any case, the
teacher would have had access to this kind of information
before the policy was developed. If a reconciliation of Vernonia
and Earls is possible, it would seem to be that Earls prevents
whatever privacy rights a student may have had under
Vernonia from limiting access by those persons in a public
school who have "a legitimate educational interest" in knowing
about the student. 146 Presumably, access to school personnel
who have a "need to know" is not a problem, as long as the
information is not revealed to those who do not have this need
to know. 147
What Earls and Vernonia do not address is the remedy that
a student might have where confidential information regarding
the medication list (or drug testing results) is revealed to
persons, such as other students, who have no need-to-know. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 148 whereby FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of
action, aggrieved students would seem to be left only with a
common law invasion of privacy action.
143. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (Court observed that the test is looking only for
drugs, "not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic").
144. See id. at 660.
145. !d. at 659 (emphasis in original).
146. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(l)(A).
147. In Earls, Justice Thomas addressed an allegation that a student might have
seen another student's medication list with the observation that "one example of
alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the intrusion." 122 S. Ct. at
2566.
148. 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002) (the Court also abrogated the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1203 (lOth Cir. 2000), determining that
a private cause of action existed under FERPA for damages; the Supreme Court in
reversing the Tenth Circuit in Falvo had addressed only the issue as to whether
education records under FERPA included student grades in a classroom).
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7. Testing Samples
The agency with whom the school board has contracted
performs the test for the substances identified in the school's
policy. The policy generally provides that the agency's test will
be performed only on a portion of the sample, saving the rest
for a retest in the event of a positive result. 149 Policies can vary
as to the tests to be performed at the expense of the school
district. Generally, the EMIT is the one performed because it
identifies the largest number of drugs at the least expensive
cost. In the event of a positive result, the policy can provide for
a retest at school expense with the same test 150 or the more
expensive gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS)
method. 151 However, a policy may provide instead that
students with a positive EMIT test can request a GC/MS test at
their own expense. 152
Consent to test for a specific group of substances does not
authorize school officials to request a test for a substance not
identified in its drug testing policy. Even if a student has a
diminished constitutional privacy right that permits random
drug testing, that privacy does not exceed the consent granted.
A student whose sample has been tested for a substance not
designated in the policy may still retain a state invasion of
privacy claim for unauthorized testing. 153

8. Report of Positive Test Results
Positive test results are reported to a designated school
official and are shared with other school personnel on a needto-know basis. 154 Although cases are vague as to who has a
need-to-know, the list would presumably include the school
official responsible for arranging a meeting with the student's
parents. The school official responsible for discipline may be
149. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 654, n. 6.
150. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975; Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 943.
151. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311; Theodore, 761 A.2d at 654.
152. Miller, 172 F.3d at 577 n. 3.
153. See Doe u. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1998) (student who
gave consent for rubella test had invasion of privacy claim where school official had
instructed testing agency to test for HIV as well).
154. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 988, n. 12 (results for tests of athletes were
provided to "the athletic director, student assessment team, substance abuse
professional, guidance counselor, coach and/or advisor"); Penn-Harris-Madison, 768
N.E.2d at 943 (school staff is provided information only on a need-to-know basis).
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included in those who need-to-know where that person must
coordinate penalties in the school policy. In instances where a
student will be removed from programs in which they have
been participating, appropriate coaches and advisors could be
included in the category of those who need-to-know. 155 Clearly,
if the student affected is a special education student whose
participation in an activity is part of an IEP, the IEP team
members will need to know if student discipline is
contemplated, removal from an activity is required, or a
manifestation hearing needs to be conducted.l 56
The basic issue to be considered in determining who should
be informed of the test results is one of student expectation of
privacy. In addition to a student's expectation of privacy in
the medications taken which were mentioned earlier, the
student probably has an expectation of privacy regarding
disclosure of test results. 157 In Vernonia, the Court was
comfortable with a standard that permitted disclosure of
results "only to a limited class of school personnel who have a
need to know .... ," 158 a standard not significantly different
from disclosure of education records under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) to a person "with
legitimate educational interests." 159

9. Defenses to a Positive Test
Drug testing policies need to provide that parents of
students testing positive for prohibited substances will be
notified and that at a parent conference with a designated
school official they will have an opportunity to explain the
positive results. If they have not previously done so, students
155. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566 (if a choir director had a "need-to-know" a
student's medication list, presumably that same director could know the results of a
drug test).
156. Athletics can have unique protected status for students with disabilities. For
an example of a case where a court ordered an IEP permitting athletic participation
even though the student had reached the age of 19 and state athletic association rules
prohibited 19-year-old students from participating, see Kling v. Mentor Pub. Sch. Dist.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ohio 2001). For an example of a case where a manifestation
hearing must be held to determine whether an IEP can be rewritten, see Parent v.
Osceola County Sch. Bd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
157. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 943 (policy provides that school
officials with access to the test results are specifically prohibited from divulging those
results to anyone other than the student, except under court order).
158. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1)(A).
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can provide a list of medications (or an amended list) that they
are taking, 160 or a statement of activities that might account for
the positive result. 161
This list of medications and/or
explanations would then be submitted to the testing agency to
determine whether any of them could account for the positive
result. A policy may also permit parents to have the remaining
portion of the urine sample tested at an agency of their
choice 162 or permit the student to be retested within 24 hours of
receiving a positive result. 163

10. Penalties for Positive Test Results
The standard penalty for a positive test is removal from
extracurricular activities. Policies differ regarding student
reinstatement with the time ranging from as soon as the
student tests negative on a subsequent test 164 to the end of a
prescribed period of time 165 or a specified number of
activities. 166 In addition to removal, a student could also be
required to participate in a drug assessment program.l 67 In
Todd, a student who tested positive twice was deemed to have
given the school reasonable suspicion justifying further drug
testing even though the student was no longer permitted to
engage in extracurricular activities. 168 With the exception of
Joy, penalties are limited to suspension from activities covered
by the policy and do not include exclusion from school
attendance .169

160. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984.
161. For an interesting higher education case involving an attempted explanation
for a positive test for anabolic steroid testosterone, see Brennan v. Bd. of Trustees for U.
of La. Sys., 691 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1997) (student unsuccessfully alleged that his high
testosterone level had been due to sexual activity the night before the test).
162. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1057.
163. See Miller, 172 F. 3d at 577, n. 3.
164. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976.
165. Miller, 172 F.3d at 577 (a student is placed on probation for 20 days, and then
if tested positive again, is banned for one year).
166. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311 (the first positive test results in suspension from
30% of athletic contests, a second test results in a 50% suspension, a third results in
suspicion for a full calendar year, and a fourth positive results in the student being
barred from all interscholastic activities for his/her high school career).
167. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 655.
168. Todd, 133 F.3d at 985.
169. See Scha.ill, 864 F.2d at 1319 ("No student will be suspended or expelled from
school."); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268 ("There are not academic sanctions imposed."); but see
.Joy, 212 F. 3d at 1056 n. 4 (where a positive test can be treated as a disciplinary offense
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Discipline
that
is
considered
preventative
and
rehabilitative, as opposed to punitive, has a better chance of
surviving constitutional challenge.
In Linke, the court
determined that a policy that removed students from
extracurricular activities for varying periods of time was
"preventative or rehabilitative," while a policy (not at issue in
the case) that would remove a student from school would be
considered punitive. 170 The implication is that non-punitive
policies mitigate more against a student's privacy interest.
Whether the results of a positive test are reported to law
enforcement authorities varies. In Earls, the testing policy
provided that test results "shall be disclosed only to those
school personnel who have a need to know and will not be
turned over to any law enforcement authorities." 171 However,
in Joy, the Student Handbook required a report to be made to
law enforcement authorities 172 and, in Linke, results were not
revealed to juvenile authorities "absent binding legal
compulsion." 173
Of the three kinds of penalties, exclusion from the school
extracurricular activity, exclusion from attendance at school,
and exposure to criminal prosecution, the first is the easiest to
defend. If the drug testing policy states a nexus between
student health/safety and drug use, removing the student from
participation seems to satisfy the purpose of the policy. 174
Removing a student from school, however, presents the issue of
a student's property interest in education 175 and raises the
question whether removing a student from an activity for the

leading to possible suspension or expulsion from the school).
170. 763 N.E.2d at 982.
171. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268_ For cases with policies in agreement with F:arls, see
also Theodore, 761 A.2d at 662; Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1100 (results disbursed to
designated school officials only)_
172. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1056 n. 4.
173. 763 N.E.2d at 975.
17 4. Generally, students do not have property interests in extracurricular
activities. However, such a property interest might exist where school documents
establishing the programs create an entitlement. See Butler u. Oak Creek-Franklin
Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
175. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (Court held that a state's
compulsory attendance law created "a student's legitimate entitlement to a public
education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and
which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum
procedures required by that Clause")_
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purpose of safety/health protection also applies to the general
academic setting.
In Trinidad School District v. Lopez, 176 the Colorado
Supreme Court invalidated a random drug testing policy that
would have resulted in a student being suspended from an
extracurricular activity (marching band) as well as receiving a
failing grade in a for-credit instrumental class that required
participation in the marching band. For the court, the
suspicionless drug testing policy failed because it "swept within
its reach students participating in an extracurricular activity
who were not demonstrated to play a role in promoting drugs
and for whom there was no demonstrated risk of physical
injury, [as well as] ... includ[ing] students enrolled in a forcredit class offered by the District." 177 In essence, removing a
student from an academic course and awarding a failing grade
takes the justification for random testing out of the arena of
voluntary participation.
Once the student has been removed from an activity
because of health/safety reasons or because of failure to be a
role model, one can argue that the school has taken the results
of suspicionless testing as far as it can go without additional
information, such as that the continued presence of the student
in school represents a risk to other students. However, such a
risk is not a conclusion that school officials can make based on
suspicionless testing; for that, they must look to individualized
suspicion of the student's behavior in the classroom setting. To
use evidence from a suspicionless search of a student involved
in an extracurricular activity, justified because extracurricular
activities are privileges, as the basis for removing a student
from attendance at school, grounded in a state-created right of
compulsory attendance, seems not only inappropriate, but also
a violation of a student's property right in school attendance.
Reporting students with positive tests to law enforcement
officials assumes that the positive result reflects a violation of
state or local law. Clearly, school officials can turn over
evidence secured from reasonable suspicion searches to law
enforcement. 178 One can argue that, assuming a suspicionless
176. 963 P.2d 1095.
177. /d. at 1110.
178. See e.g. F.S.E. u. State, 99:{ P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. J\pp. 1999) (marijuana
found in student's car as a result of reasonable suspicion search could be used in
juvenile proceeding).
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search is lawful, the same result should apply. However, the
Supreme Court in Vernonia pointedly noted that test results in
that case "[were] not turned over to law enforcement
authorities ... "179 and a similar observation was made in
Earls. 180 Both decisions appear to suggest that disclosure to
law enforcement goes to the privacy interest of students and
that school officials need more evidence in a suspicionless
search than just positive test results before being permitted to
turn evidence over to law enforcement. 181
Because a
suspicionless search represents a lower search standard than
individualized reasonable suspicion, school officials may need
evidence that the student is more than just a drug testing
policy violator and represents, in addition, a risk to other
students.

III.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Earls, courts had been reluctant to support random
drug testing where there was no evidence of a serious drug
problem and where those being tested were not the persons
contributing to the drug problem. Some courts refused to find
a basis to support suspicionless testing where the students
being tested did not have the same health and safety risks of
physical injury as did athletes. Earls has made clear under the
Fourth Amendment that schools do not have to wait until they
have evidence of a drug problem in order to institute a random
drug testing policy. However, whether states will apply that
standard in interpreting their own constitutions remains to be
seen.
Judicial concern for the privacy rights of students has a
troubling side.
Public school officials are charged with
maintaining a safe school environment. Suspicionless random
drug testing, which involves minimal inconvenience to
179. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
180. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566.
181. In a non-education case, Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court
refused to lower the level of privacy protection for home occupants from police use of
infrared scanners. The notion that Jaw enforcement officers must have probable cause
to scan a person's house may have implications for privacy generally. Arguably, school
law enforcement officials should not have access to information that is normally
protected by confidentiality without meeting the standard of individualized reasonable
suspicion. Attempting to access this information through the suspicionless testing or
language in a consent form may be challengeable as an invasion of privacy.
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students, provides an easily administered process with both
specific and general outcomes. Specifically, the school, by tying
extracurricular activity participation to testing, has a
mechanism both for discouraging drug use and penalizing
those who do use drugs without removing them from academic
programs. In general, a random drug testing policy sends a
message to parents and taxpayers that the school district is
genuinely concerned with preventing drug use. 182 Indeed,
parents may demand drug testing for their school district,
perhaps placing school officials who may not want to address
legal issues associated with testing in a difficult position. How
can school officials be opposed to student drug use and not use
a legal remedy in drug testing that is available to them?
Drug testing may not be the only remedy available to school
officials in deterring drug use, but schools do not have an
infinite continuum of alternatives. Even with the legal issues
associated with random testing, development of a random
testing policy represents action against drug use. A random
testing policy that succeeds in preventing drug use would
appear to be more effective in promoting the well-being of a
school, its students, and teachers than a drug use crisis that
may take years to resolve.

182. E.g. Linke, N.E.2d at 981 (the court remarks that "parents may be reluctant
to allow their children to participate in voluntary school activities if schools are not
permitted to take the reasonable steps taken [by the school district in the case] to
prevent drug use").

